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I have learned to think of History in a Marxist sense 
as comprising a constant becoming of modes of 
production. The present is a site contested by past 
and future histories, the now being a set of traces 
of the past and anticipations of future presents in 
our social structure. This notion of History is even 
more emphatic in the Althusserian-Lacanian sense 
of the Real as that which can never be known, has 
no presence, but nevertheless is at the same time 
‘produced’ by the Imaginary and the Symbolic. 
History is the black hole you can never see but 
which nevertheless controls the wobbles and trajec-
tories of all the things (like buildings and texts and 
cities and landscapes) that we historians and theo-
rists care about. History, the becoming of modes 
of production, is determinant of all representations 
and how they do their work. 
Theory takes history as its subject matter, and 
there can be no writing of history without theory. The 
more theory, the more access to history. Theory is 
the practice that produces concepts and categories 
to map the Real of History. So the practice of theory 
will ultimately have to deal with some version of the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic, since in this schema, 
these are the orders that attempt to manage and 
make sense of the Real.
Architecture is a primary exhibit in theorising 
History because architecture is the most complexly 
contested and negotiated of all cultural representa-
tions and productions. Issues of perception, subject 
formation, language, image, and code are funda-
mental in the study of the architectural Imaginary 
and Symbolic. The determinate context of a single 
building comprises all the technological, economic, 
juridical, and psychological forces that drive produc-
tion in the city. And the conﬂ ictedly overdetermined 
claims and demands placed on a building by society 
- its patrons, its publics, and by the city - are both 
ﬁ gured and repressed in its very form. Thus in the 
careful and close constructions of the historian, 
architecture appears as a precious index of the 
social fact, and of History itself.
The role of the historian is not principally to 
describe buildings or architects, to produce biogra-
phies, explications, and specialised commentaries 
- though we do that, too. The role of the historian is 
rather to be concerned with the larger conditions on 
which architectural knowledge and action is made 
possible: with the multiple agencies of culture in 
their ideological and historical and worldly forms.
I have come to think of history this way by study-
ing architecture historiography - its great Hegelian 
tradition and its own critiques of that tradition, not 
least among which is the work of Manfredo Tafuri. 
Writers of architecture history since the nineteenth 
century have attempted to reconcile a materialist 
understanding of history with the undeniably psycho-
logical, experiential effects of architecture. Trying to 
understand that tradition in turn led me to certain 
works outside of architecture, especially those of 
Theodor Adorno, Louis Althusser, and others of a 
‘Freudo-Marxist’ tendency, to use loose shorthand. 
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And trying to understand that body of work led me 
to contemporary ﬁ gures like Fredric Jameson who, 
necessarily perhaps, also had to confront Manfredo 
Tafuri. Therefore, while this set of notes may in fact 
be nothing more than an outline of my own position, 
they feel to me like inescapable conclusions.
I will suggest here that narrative is the privileged 
mode of exposition in historiography - of writing 
history, writing the history of a discipline, a cultural 
practice, and a medium. I am reminded, of course, 
that this suggestion appears just after a time when 
there was much said about that privileged place of 
narrative, at least of the kind that assumes history is 
something you can see, be a witness to, be present 
at. Most famously, Jean-François Lyotard made the 
interdiction against any grand narrative and against 
all totalisations. But we can accept Lyotard’s criticism 
of the narratives of legitimation (indeed Lyotard’s 
own account is more of a report of their spontane-
ous decline than a call for their wilful destruction) 
and still insist that it is not contradictory to say that 
critiques of certain narratives can themselves be 
narratives, just as when Lyotard states that ‘every 
utterance should be thought of as a “move” in a 
game’, his statement is itself a move in a language 
game. Indeed, it is part of our problematic as histo-
rians that we should try to accomplish the almost 
impossible task of thinking historiography itself as 
a historical and ideological production in its own 
right, of thinking the historian as part of the process 
viewed. This is a task more complicated than any 
objective apprehension of a merely external kind 
of structure or inﬂ uence or bias, such as we some-
times get from some less theoretical practices.
This issue of narrative does not usually concern 
studies such as small-scale formal analyses of indi-
vidual buildings or texts, though I think that narrative 
does leave its traces even on those writing projects. 
Like critique, narrative practice is transgeneric, 
which is to say that even synchronic studies are 
tacitly narrative episodes in a larger story. And even 
synoptic studies - those that treat an entire career, 
for example, or an entire group movement as a 
single project - are in fact condensations of open 
narrative processes.
A fundamental problem of writing history is to 
solve the dilemma: Any strictly empiricist account 
of history is impossible, and architecture can never 
be understood as simply a copy or reﬂ ection of 
historical conditions. Nevertheless, history is real 
and architecture is representational (even if not 
in any straightforward way). Narrative solves this 
dilemma, at once avoiding any reﬂ ection theories of 
art and problems of verisimilitude and, at the same 
time, constructing a material basis for architecture’s 
representational function.
We can enumerate a few features of narrative:
1. Narrative is a precondition for dialectical think-
ing: a sense of necessity, even of necessary failure 
- of closure, of ultimately irresolvable contradictions 
- is one of the hallmarks of dialectical thinking that 
can be conveyed only through narrative. The owl 
of Minerva takes ﬂ ight only at dusk.1 Dialectical 
interpretation is always retrospective, always tells 
the necessity of an event, why it had to happen the 
way it did. To do that, the event must have already 
happened; the story must have already come to an 
end. This last may seem obvious but it is important 
to add that such histories of necessity and of deter-
minate failure are inseparable from some ultimate 
historical perspective of reconciliation, of some 
future, of the ‘end of prehistory’ in Marx’s sense. 
The past has to be written as the determinant of 
the present so that the present can also be a past 
for a future.
2. The writing of history can be thought as taking 
place within a series of cascading levels, which mark 
a widening out of contexts. First, within the structure 
of an architectural signiﬁ er, the object of study is still 
construed more or less as the individual building or 
project, events or situation, with the form as a signi-
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ﬁ er and an architectural concept as its signiﬁ ed. 
The architectural sign, then, is the unit made up of 
these two components. Second, the architectural 
sign is understood at a higher level as the signiﬁ er 
of a set of concepts that organise our understand-
ing and experience of the architectural sign. We 
can use Althusser’s term and call this a theoretical 
problematic. The architectural sign together with its 
theoretical problematic produces and is produced by 
a particular ideology. That ideology is itself a kind of 
imaginary map of a socially symbolic ﬁ eld. Perhaps 
this is not an inaccurate way of understanding the 
fundamental role played by architecture in Fredric 
Jameson’s notion of cognitive mapping, which may 
be understood here as the provisional totalisation 
of an imaginary, ideological form and the social fact 
that is its ultimate referent. On this view, the ultimate 
horizon, to return to our previous formulation, is the 
Real of History itself [ﬁ g. 1].
The structure should be read forward and back-
ward at the same time. Which is to say that History 
is both the unrepresentable absent cause of the 
‘superstructural’ activities such as architecture and 
cognitive mapping, even as History is produced by 
the same such Imaginary-Symbolic cultural activi-
ties and practices.
3. Such a model of architecture and history is 
dependent on a perspective that reads the work of 
architecture against a context or situation recon-
structed or rewritten as having latent contradictions, 
so that the historian then has the ability to interpret 
a given work of art as a provisional ‘solution’ to that 
situation. Implicit here is the construction of a history 
of architecture in terms of a series of situations, 
dilemmas, and contradictions, in terms of which 
individual works, styles, and forms can be seen as 
so many responses or determinate symbolic acts.
Understood this way, the construal of contexts 
and situations construed as contradictions is 
productive in the long run. A contradiction is really a 
singular substance about which different things can 
be written, and multiple perspectives generated. It 
then requires theoretical work to show that the two 
contradictory things are related - the one implied 
by the other in some unexpected way. To present 
architecture as the unexpected symbolic resolution 
of a conﬂ icted social situation is perhaps the histori-
an’s greatest intellectual thrill.2
To understand architecture as a symbolic reso-
lution of a social situation suggests that the deep 
problem of contradiction is representational, which 
is thus also related to narrative. Contradiction is the 
step just before representation: The historian shows 
a situation in a conﬂ icted moment; a response is 
anticipated and doubt about a possible resolution 
is raised. This is also where we insist that it is the 
formal-aesthetic dimension that does social work, 
that in the very folds of the aesthetic object the social 
contents are richly operative. Then the historian 
triumphantly shows how architecture both ‘solves’ 
the contradiction (even if the ‘solution’ is a negative 
one of sublimating or suppressing the very exist-
ence of the contradiction in architecture’s form). 
I shall refer to my own paper on Mies van der 
Rohe’s Seagram Building as an example. In that 
paper I argued that Mies’s much discussed abstrac-
tion should not be understood as an absence of 
representation or ﬁ gure, but rather the contrary: it 
is the achievement of the limit condition of repre-
sentation at a certain moment in time, the moment 
of the explosive expansion of consumer culture. 
Henri Lefebvre articulates for us this new condi-
tion as a kind of space that is produced as it is 
consumed - abstract space. ‘Thus space appears 
solely in its reduced forms. Volume leaves the ﬁ eld 
to surface, and any overall view surrenders to visual 
signals spaced out along ﬁ xed trajectories already 
laid down in the “plan”. An extraordinary - indeed 
unthinkable, impossible - confusion gradually arises 
between space and surface, with the latter deter-
mining a spatial abstraction which it endows with a 
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Signiﬁ er (Form)
-------------------------------    Architectural Sign
Signiﬁ ed (Concept)            -------------------------------       Ideology (Imaginary)
      Theoretical Problematic      -------------------------------       Cognitive Mapping
         Social (Symbolic)                 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           HISTORY (Real)
Fig. 1: The Real of History
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half-imaginary, half-real existence.’3
My argument in the Mies paper is that the abstrac-
tion of Seagram’s empty plaza and glass curtain 
wall is an architectural ﬁ gure - a symbolic resolu-
tion of the contradiction of Mies’s desire to maintain 
the fullness of aesthetic experience and the actual, 
practical impossibility of aesthetic profundity in the 
context of total reiﬁ cation. Mies’s abstraction of 
surface is both the consequence and perfect repre-
sentation of consumer capital and a profound refusal 
to accept the complete dissolution of the traditional 
aesthetic experience. I quote myself:
The crucial move of Mies is to pose abstraction as 
at one and the same time the ultimate achievement 
of reiﬁ cation - the separation and neutralisation of 
the full range of experience being the precondition 
of abstract thought - and a historically new expe-
rience, the only possible experience adequate 
to everything we have lost in reiﬁ cation. Here I 
circle back to the epigraph with which I began: art 
must submit to reiﬁ cation in order to preserve the 
possibility of something more true. What results in 
the Seagram building is a series of transductions 
whereby abstraction changes its nature as it passes 
from the social to the aesthetic and back again. The 
plaza at Seagram is perhaps the ﬁ rst pulling back 
from the alienating life of the metropolis, and the 
assertion of the architectural surface as the support 
for that space is commensurate with that withdrawal. 
At this point, however, reiﬁ cation is borrowed back 
from the social in the form of the volumetric ready-
made of the high-rise building and, even more, in 
the perception of the abstract surface. Then, in a 
ﬁ nal moment of transfer, reiﬁ cation appears as 
the experience of abstraction. By producing the 
abstract, architecture acquires a means to escape 
that same status, to refuse to become a mere thing 
among things. Abstraction - the pure sound of the 
Sirens, the organising absent presence - is the 
maximal limit of the avant-garde.4
4. Within a narrative structure, periodisation is a 
technique that allows epistemic access to histori-
cal differences in a situation, allowing articulation of 
what can appear as an undifferentiated mass or a 
bunch of incoherent differences. But periodisation is 
an initial move, not a ﬁ nal one. We should not think 
in terms of uniform periods and radical breaks but 
rather more nuanced shifts, making the placement 
of the speciﬁ c work in the historical ﬁ eld every more 
complex and differentiated. 
The case of the Seagram Building is an example 
of small-scale periodisation. The materials for 
Mies’s optical surface were already present in his 
early skyscrapers in Chicago. The speciﬁ c case of 
Seagram was made possible by a series of events 
- those related to the emergence of the new appara-
tus of surface perception, like the television screen, 
magazine advertising, and large billboards - whose 
results were seized on and ‘detourned’ toward 
speciﬁ c ends. These events take centre stage only 
retroactively, and retroactively can be understood 
as the pre-history of the form that was to follow.
Thus does narrative history involve the narration 
of the necessity of the outcome. Althusser puts this 
point in terms of contingency and necessity:
Instead of thinking of contingency as a modality of 
or an exception to the necessary, one must think 
necessity as the becoming-necessary of contingent 
encounters.5
5. The technique of dialectical reversal is related 
both to the perception of necessity and contin-
gency, and to the situational character of narrative. 
This can take many forms. In the work of Tafuri, for 
example, it usually takes the form of showing the 
physical and social city as the Other of the build-
ing, then showing that the outside of the practice 
of architecture itself - understood in an expanded 
sense as including urbanism and city planning and 
territorial management - is the vaster totality of the 
28
economic system, the ‘last instance’, as Althusser 
put it. So the great European urban projects of the 
1920s like the Siedlungen in Berlin, Frankfurt, and 
Vienna, for example, come up against their other 
in the seemingly ‘extrinsic’ obstacles of ﬁ nancial 
speculation and the rise of property values that ulti-
mately causes their absolute failure and an end to 
their utopian vocation.
In the Seagram example, the appearance of 
abstraction is itself a dialectical reversal insofar as 
Mies’s abstraction arises out of what Lefebvre called 
abstract space and also appears as the negation of 
the same.
6. The technique of mediation or transcoding is one 
of the best lessons from theory: to cross or shift an 
interpretive code or analytic term from one domain 
to another, testing one against the other, ﬁ nding the 
limits of each, causing each to interpret the other. 
In the Seagram example, surface is the mediating 
term and ﬁ gure, which is operative in the popular 
cultural perceptual apparatus and in the curtain 
wall, but operative in different ways.
The mediatory function releases unnoticed 
complicities and commonalities between different 
items or events that were thought to remain singu-
lar, divergent, and differently constituted. Mediating 
among different discourses has sponsored a rich 
literature that addresses itself to a whole range of 
practical issues - the role of the unconscious, the 
socially constructed body, ecology, the politics of 
spatial relations, and more. 
7. Totalisation is meant to function as a prescription 
to strive constantly to relate and connect, to situate 
and interpret each object or event in the contexts 
and conditions of possibility that enable it and limit 
it. Of course, this is practically impossible; totali-
sation must remain an aspiration of the historian, 
not an accomplishment. The aspiration to totalise 
leads us back to the problem of representation, for 
the totalisation is an absent structure rather than 
something that can be grasped empirically or even 
analytically. Like History, the totalisation is not avail-
able for representation. And yet we must strive to 
narrate it.
In particular, I have in mind the Sartrean termi-
nological version wherein ‘totalisation’ is opposed 
to a hypostatised and inert ‘totality’ to become the 
correlate of ‘praxis’ itself. That is, the reiﬁ ed ‘prac-
tico-inert’ is to totality as praxis is to totalisation, 
the last being understood as a ‘developing activity 
which cannot cease without the multiplicity revert-
ing to its original statute… The activity attempts the 
most rigorous synthesis of the most differentiated 
multiplicity’.6
By totalisation I do not mean a normative unity 
imposed by architecture or the historian on a situ-
ation where none actually exists; nor do I mean 
that the particular must everywhere represent the 
general. A totalisation is not a unity. I have in mind, 
rather, a discontinuous ﬁ nitude in which seemingly 
discreet and compartmentalised events and images 
are made to relate to one another in concrete and 
material ways, or better, are made through a medi-
ating ﬁ gure to be seen again as relating to one 
another, since they were never really separate to 
begin with. 
We can think of the early Miesian plan grid and 
reiterative steel frame, together with the serialised 
facade as the spatial ﬁ gure adequate for an entire 
range of modern experiences, from the standardisa-
tion and mass production of Henry Ford’s assembly 
lines, to Fredrick Taylor’s labour processes and 
workshop organisations, to the reiﬁ cation of Georg 
Lukács’s modern labourer. In the Seagram building 
that grid is morphed into an optical surface, a new 
mediating ﬁ gure that also includes the surface of 
the billboard, the surface of television, the surface of 
abstract space itself. This example suggests a way 
in which an architectural ﬁ gure can carry the idea 
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of a real social situation within itself as a constant 
reminder, like a phantom limb that has been surgi-
cally amputated but nevertheless emits a constant 
reminder of its non-existence.
We must recognise here, of course, that through 
its very success in so modulating and focussing our 
perception of the situation, the totalising process 
also survives in the form of reiﬁ ed categories that 
should be understood as an obstacle to spontane-
ity and heterogeneity. Perhaps any totalisation must 
end up being transformed into its own representa-
tion, as Sartre said, ‘just as the unity of a medallion 
is the passive remnant of its being struck.’
8. I have listed a few of the attributes of narrative 
method. I will close by saying something about the 
particular form I believe that narratives must take. 
While it is certain that new modes of analysis and 
exposition should be constantly explored, the funda-
mental work of the historian is writing.
I would like to attribute to the writing of history a 
certain programmatic difﬁ culty. First, writing should 
sink itself into the unnaturalness of the work of 
writing history, of the hermeneutic situation, of the 
historicity of the historian and the written-ness of 
historiography. Of all the techniques, this is perhaps 
the most difﬁ cult: thinking historiography as a histor-
ical and ideological production in its own right. It is 
also a matter of thinking the positive side of ideology 
as well as the negative, at the same time, of under-
standing that ideology makes things possible as 
well as closes things down. Second, history should 
be written so that something - some ﬁ nal resolution, 
some mystery - remains something out of reach. We 
should be suspicious of a thesis that de-mystiﬁ es 
too much, that makes the architecture under analy-
sis look easy. The reader should be asked by the 
writing, instead, to constantly think another side, an 
outside, an external face of the apparent concepts, 
which can never be visible or accessible but which 
we must vigilantly reckon into our sense, in the form 
of effects. This requires sentences that strive to hold 
contradictory concepts together. 
To put it a different way, the practice of writing I am 
proposing would be a force that thickens the situa-
tion, slows thinking down, that keeps something of 
the human mystery that stands opposed to a text 
that is too packaged and easy.
It is at this point that we should also recognise 
that no method or tool of interpretation should be 
discarded offhand. In other words, the least interest-
ing way to intervene in a debate over techniques of 
interpretation is to declare one of them right and the 
others wrong. Almost any technique has some local 
validity, some possibilities as well as limitations, 
and depending on the project, a variety will have 
to be tried out and combined. What is most needed 
is openness and ﬂ exibility of mind, and generosity 
of spirit.
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